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Abstract
Estimated impulse responses of investment and hiring typically peak well after
the impact of a shock. Standard models with adjustment costs in capital and labor
do not exhibit such delayed adjustment, but we argue that it arises naturally when
we relax the assumption that the production technology is separable over time.
This result holds for both non-convex and convex cost functions, and for reasonable
parameter values the e¤ect is strong enough to match the persistence observed in
the data. We discuss some evidence for our explanation and ways to test the model.
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1 Introduction
A typical impulse response function for investment estimated from aggregate data (e.g.
Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Linde (2011)) to a technology or monetary policy
shock, has a hump shape. Investment jumps up in response to the shock, and then
continues to increase before gradually falling back to zero. Most macroeconomic models
since the rst contributions to real business cycle theory correctly predict the sign and
size of this response (King and Rebelo (1999a)), but have trouble explaining why there
is a lag before investment peaks after a shock.
A similar puzzle arises for investments in labor input. In frictional labor market
models as in Diamond (1982), Mortensen (1982) and Pissarides (1985), employment is
a state variable, in which rms may invest through costly hiring. Estimates show a
clear hump shape not only in the response of employment (Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Evans (1999)), but also in that of the job nding rate (as a measure of hiring), to
technology (Canova, Lopez-Salido, and Michelacci (2010), Canova, Lopez-Salido, and
Michelacci (2013)) and monetary policy shocks (White (2018)).1
In this paper, we propose a small and plausible modication to standard models that
generates the type of hump-shaped impulse responses for investment and hiring observed
in the data. We relax the assumption, implicit in almost all macroeconomic models, that
the production technology is intertemporally separable. In combination with standard
adjustment costs in capital and labor, a non-separable production technology gives rise
to delayed adjustment: the peak of hiring and investment takes place a while after a
shock has hit the economy. We show that delayed adjustment arises for both non-
convex and convex adjustment cost functions, and that for reasonable parameter values
the e¤ect is strong enough to match the persistence observed in the data.
Modern theories of investment are micro-founded versions of Lucas (1967)s exible
accelerator model: investment is increasing in the distance between the actual and
the desired stock of capital or labor. Depending on the specics of the model, capital
adjusts gradually (with convex adjustment costs) or instantaneously (with xed adjust-
ment costs or irreversible investments) to its target. While intuitively attractive, these
models have the counterfactual implication that investment is highest immediately after
a change in demand or productivity, when the capital stock is furthest away from its tar-
get. In reality, rms slowly increase their investments, with most investment happening
as much as 18 months after a shock.
We are not the rst to notice that macroeconomic models do not seem to match the
persistence in macroeconomic aggregates. The lack of propagation in these models is
a long standing puzzle (Cogley and Nason (1995); Rotemberg and Woodford (1996)),
although the literature seems to have focused more on the lack of amplication, perhaps
1 In fact, the puzzle is even starker for hiring than it is for investment. While the autocorrelation of
capital is quite a bit higher than that of investment, the same is not true for employment compared to
hiring, and almost all of the persistence in employment seems to be driven by persistence in hiring. A
time series for the steady state unemployment rate corresponding to the current job nding rate looks
almost indistinguishable from the actual unemployment rate (Shimer (2012)).
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because adjustment costs provide a straightforward way to increase the autocorrelation
in the model. As opposed to the early contributions on propagation, we draw a sharp
distinction between the persistence in stock and ow variables, arguing that adjustment
costs may explain persistence and hump-shaped responses in the stocks (capital and em-
ployment), but they cannot by themselves account for persistence in the ows (invest-
ment and hiring). Many researchers are aware of this problem (Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Trabandt (2018), Fiori (2012)), and often resort to cost-of-change adjustment costs,
as in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005)). We show that the dynamics of our
model with a non-separable production function are very similar to the dynamics of
models with cost-of-change adjustment costs, even though we use standard adjustment
costs in the levels of investment and hiring.
We model non-separabilities in the production technology by introducing an ad-
ditional state variable, which we label organizational capital, that acts as a storage
technology for capital and labor input. This is the simplest way to relax the extreme as-
sumption that all current capital and labor input immediately contributes to production,
and that current capital and labor are the only inputs in production. Organizational
capital is the accumulation of organizational investment, infrequent activities that are
crucial to the rm in the long run, but do not immediately benet production in the
short run. The infrequent nature of these activities generates a margin of adjustment
for production. When faced with higher demand or productivity, rms can temporarily
expand production without investing in more capital or hiring more workers. Eventually,
further depleting the stock of organizational capital becomes costly, and investment and
hiring increase slowly, as they do in the data.
A good example of an organizational investment from our own production technol-
ogy as academics is giving a research seminar. Giving a seminar does not immediately
contribute to the production of research papers. In fact, it takes time away from directly
productive activities like analyzing data or writing text. However, the comments we re-
ceive from colleagues and potential referees at the seminar do a¤ect the quality of our
paper, and may inuence the direction of our work for many months or even years after-
wards. More generic examples of organizational investments are machine maintenance,
employee training and sta¤ meetings to coordinate team work.
Probably the most direct evidence for the mechanism we have in mind comes from
a, now somewhat dated, survey of plant managers by Fay and Medo¤ (1985). In this
survey, managers recalled how many workers they let go in the last recession, and were
then asked how many they could have let go while still meeting demand. The di¤erence,
which on average amounted to 6% less workers red than would have been feasible, was
interpreted as labor hoarding. More importantly for our purposes, a follow-up ques-
tion about what happened to the hoardedworkers revealed that half of the 6% were
assigned to other work, including (in order of importance): cleaning, painting, main-
tenance of equipment, equipment overhaul and training, all of which are examples of
what we would call investments in organizational capital. Since the Fay and Medo¤
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(1985) survey provides only a shapshot, we also consider capacity utilization as a proxy
measure for lack of organizational investments, and we show that the dynamics of ca-
pacity utilization in the data (Fernald (2012)) are consistent with the predictions of our
model, even though we do not target this variable in the calibration.
The interpretation of non-separabilities in production as organizational investment
relates this paper to the literature on organizational and intangible capital. A number
of papers show that organizational capital and other intangible assets are important
part of the productivity and stock market value of rms (Prescott and Visscher (1980),
Blanchard and Kremer (1997), Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000), Lev, Radhakrishnan, and
Zhang (2009), Hall (2000b), Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013), McGrattan and Prescott
(2012), Conesa and Domínguez (2013)). We contribute to this literature by analyzing
the e¤ect of organizational capital on business cycle dynamics. We also explore further
ways to test our model using an empirical literature aiming to measure organizational
capital (Atkeson and Kehoe (2005), Black and Lynch (2005), Corrado, Hulten, and
Sichel (2009), Squicciarini and Mouel (2012)).
As an application of our framework, we analyze the emergence of the jobless recov-
eries after the recession of 1991. In some past recessions in the US, employment have
remained low for a few months after the trough date, but after recent recessions, ending
in March 1991 and November 2001, employment has been particularly slow to recover,
taking 14 and 29 months respectively for employment to return to the level it was at
the NBER trough date (Schreft and Singh (2003), Aaronson, Rissman, and Sullivan
(2004)).2 We argue that this change in business cycle dynamics is consistent with our
model, since there has been an increase in the importance of organizational capital for
production over the same time period (Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel (2009)), which is
quantitatively consistent with the increase in persistence under our model. While hardly
a smoking gun, this observation provides some further evidence for the mechanism
proposed in this paper.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. To set the stage, in section 2
we rst analyze a simplied business cycle model with adjustment cost in employment
and use it to document the persistence puzzle for hiring. We continue working with
this simple model in section 3, but add a non-separable production technology to show
that the model then gives rise to delayed adjustment, both for non-convex (xed) and
for convex (quadratic) adjustment costs. Section 4 simply shows that the argument for
hiring in the previous two sections goes through for investment as well. In section 5,
we add a bit of realism to the model, which now features a non-separable production
function in both labor and capital, calibrate it, and show that the delay in adjustment is
quantitatively important and matches the persistence in hiring and investment observed
2Galí, Smets, and Wouters (2012) have argued that recent recoveries are not so much jobless, but
overall slow, in terms of output as well as employment. Other studies nd evidence for a change in the
comovement of output and employment as well (Bachmann (2012), Berger (2012), Jaimovich and Siu
(2018)). Since our model can generate an increase in persistence in investment as well as hiring, the
distinction is not important for the purposes of this paper.
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in the data. Section 6 aims to provide some evidence for the mechanism by documenting
the dynamics for proxies of organizational investment and analyzing the implications of
the model for di¤erences across industries and changes over time (the emergence of the
jobless recoveries). Section 7 concludes.
2 The dynamics of employment and hiring
In this section, we set up a model environment that allows us to illustrate the lack of
propagation in standard business cycle models. A lack of persistence is present both in
investment and in hiring, but the puzzle is more pronounced for hiring. Therefore, we
focus on hiring and simplify the model by assuming the capital stock is xed (we revisit
the lack of propagation in investment in section 4). Our starting point is a business
cycle model with adjustment costs. For reasons of exposition, we keep the model as
simple as possible.
2.1 A simple model of employment adjustment
Our economy produces Yt goods in each period t, according to a production technology
that requires only labor Nt,
Yt = AtN
1 
t (1)
where At is the state of technology, which is normalized to have mean 1, and diminishing
returns to labor in production are measured by the parameter  2 (0; 1). We analyze the
response of the model to a one-time, unexpected and permanent change in technology
At. The deterministic case allows us to formally describe the model dynamics under a
range of specications for the adjustment costs function. In the quantitative analysis in
section 5, we will allow At to follow a stochastic Markov process.
Employment Nt increases or decreases through hiring ht > 0 or ring ht < 0 accord-
ing to the following law of motion,
Nt = Nt 1 + ht (2)
where we assumed that employment does not depreciate, i.e. there are no exogenous
separations.
We assume that both the goods market and the labor market are perfectly com-
petitive, so that the equilibrium is e¢ cient and we can consider the social planners
problem. Furthermore, we assume the utility function is linear in consumption and
leisure, so that the intertemporal consumption allocation is irrelevant and the social
planners optimization problem is equivalent to maximizing prots,
max
fhtg1t=0
1X
t=0

1
1 + r
t
[Yt   Nt   g (ht)] (3)
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subject to (2), where r is the discount rate,  is the disutility from working (and the
wage) and g (:) is an adjustment costs function. The optimal hiring policy depends on
the form of this function.
2.2 Optimal hiring policy
We analyze two cases for the adjustment costs function, which are both prevalent in
the literature: xed adjustment costs and quadratic adjustment costs. These two cases,
which are in some sense opposite extremes, convey the intuition for the model dynamics
under non-convex and convex adjustment costs more generally.
As a benchmark, rst consider the frictionless optimal allocation. In the absence of
adjustment costs, the planner sets hiring to achieve the optimal level of employment, so
that we obtain the frictionless optimal level of employment Nt simply by maximizing
(3), with g (ht) = 0, over Nt.
Nt =

(1  )At

1=
(4)
In a model with adjustment costs, we can think of the frictionless optimal level as
the desired level of employment. The optimal hiring policy aims to achieve a balance
between bringing employment close to its desired level while keeping adjustment costs
low.
2.2.1 Fixed adjustment costs
Fixed adjustment costs are represented by the cost function g (h) =  for h 6= 0 and
g (0) = 0. This cost function is non-convex around zero employment adjustment, which
introduces a discontinuity in the optimal hiring policy. The idea is that making any
changes to the number of workers in the rm implies costly adjustments, but once
adjustments are being made, the number of workers that are being hired or red is
irrelevant.
With xed adjustment costs, the optimal hiring policy is a bang bangadjustment,
as described in lemma 1. In response to small shocks, no adjustment takes place, whereas
in response to larger shocks employment is adjusted all the way to its frictionless optimal
level. The proof of lemma 1 is a straightforward application of the theory of irreversible
investment (see Dixit and Pindyck (1994), Caballero (1999)) and is given in appendix
A.1.
Lemma 1 With xed adjustment costs, the optimal hiring policy in response to a change
in technology in the employment adjustment problem described by equations (3), (1) and
(2) depends on the distance of employment Nt 1 from its frictionless optimal level Nt ,
as in equation (4), and can be characterized as follows:
1. It is optimal to neither hire nor re if Nt  Nt 1 is su¢ ciently close to zero;
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2. It is optimal to hire Nt   Nt 1 workers if Nt   Nt 1 is su¢ ciently positive and
to re Nt 1  Nt workers if Nt  Nt 1 is su¢ ciently negative.
The optimal policy described in lemma 1 is approximately symmetric around Nt  
Nt = 0 and may be summarized as,
ht =
8><>:
Nt  Nt 1 (hiring) if Nt  Nt 1 > b (Nt )
0 (inertia) if   b (Nt ) < Nt  Nt 1 < b (Nt )
Nt  Nt 1 (ring) if Nt  Nt 1 <  b (Nt )
(5)
where the width of the region of inertia b (Nt ) '
p
2r Nt = > 0 is increasing in the
adjustment costs  and the discount rate r, see appendix A.1.
The response of hiring to a change in technology under this policy is either zero, or
a spike in hiring that immediately brings employment to its desired level, which is the
frictionless optimal level. Whether hiring responds or not depends on the size of the
shock, expressed as the distance between employment and its desired level relative to the
adjustment costs. The intuition for this policy is that the planner adjusts employment
if and only if the increase in the net present value of prots from having the optimal
level of employment instead of the current level exceeds the adjustment costs.
The dynamics of hiring and employment under xed adjustment costs are represen-
tative for the dynamics under any non-convex adjustment cost function. If adjustment
costs increase proportionally in the size of the adjustment in addition to, or instead of,
a xed costs component, or if changes in productivity are not permanent, then it will
no longer be optimal to adjust employment to the frictionless optimal level. However,
the optimal hiring policy will still be characterized by a hiring region, a region of inertia
and a ring region, which depend on the distance of employment from its desired level,
see Caballero (1999). The intuition is that with non-convex adjustment cost functions,
adjustments to employment lead to a loss in prots that is irreversible, i.e. that is not
made good if the adjustment is reversed, so that by adjusting rms lose the option value
of waiting for a shock to be reversed over time.
2.2.2 Quadratic adjustment costs
Convex adjustment costs give rise to qualitatively di¤erent dynamics than non-convex
adjustment costs. We analyze the case of quadratic costs, g (h) = 12 h
2, which we can
think of as an approximation of any convex adjustment costs function. A convex cost
function implies that adjustment costs get very small for small amounts of hiring, so
that innitesimal adjustment in employment are costless and therefore reversible. This
provides an incentive to smooth out adjustment over time, and the optimal response
to a change in technology under quadratic adjustment costs is to hire (or re) a small
number of workers in each period over a long time, as described in lemma 2.
Lemma 2 With quadratic adjustment costs, the optimal hiring policy in response to a
change in technology in the employment adjustment problem described by equations (3),
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(1) and (2) can be described by Euler equation (6) for hiring, and has the following
properties:
1. Hiring (or ring) starts immediately and continues for all periods after the shock,
eventually approaching zero as employment Nt approaches its desired level Nt as
in (4); and
2. Hiring monotonically declines over time as employment Nt adjusts to close the gap
from its desired level Nt  Nt.
The proof of lemma 2 is immediate from the Euler equation for hiring (6), which is
derived from a straightforward dynamic programming problem in appendix A.2,
ht =

 

Nt
Nt

  1

+
1
1 + r
Etht+1 ' 
 

Nt  Nt
Nt

+
1
1 + r
Etht+1 (6)
where the second equality follows from a rst-order Taylor approximation. For compa-
rability with the optimal policy under non-convex costs, we express the Euler equation
in terms of Nt and Nt , the current and desired levels of employment respectively.
As in the case of xed adjustment costs, the optimal policy under quadratic costs de-
pends on the distance of employment Nt from its frictionless optimal level Nt . However,
under convex costs, this dependence is continuous rather than bang bang.
2.3 The dynamics of hiring in the model
The dynamics of hiring predicted by the model are quite di¤erent depending on the
specication of adjustment costs, as illustrated above. A large strand of literature
debates what adjustment cost specication is most appropriate for aggregate dynamics.
Whereas there is good evidence for lumpiness in investment (Doms and Dunne (1998),
Haltiwanger, Cooper, and Power (1999)) and hiring (Cooper, Haltiwanger, and Willis
(2015)) at the plant level, these non-convexities may be less relevant in the aggregate
level due to general equilibrium e¤ects (Thomas (2002), Khan and Thomas (2008)),
although they may still a¤ect the propagation of shocks (Gourio and Kashyap (2007),
Bachmann, Caballero, and Engel (2013)).
Here, we focus on a feature of the dynamics of hiring that is common across di¤er-
ent specications for adjustment costs. As shown above, for both xed and quadratic
adjustment costs, hiring ht is (weakly) monotonic in the distance of employment from
its desired level, and zero when that distance equals zero. We might label this feature
of the optimal hiring policy the exible acceleratorproperty, following Clark (1917),
Samuelson (1939) and Lucas (1967).
An implication of the exible accelerator property is that hiring (or ring) is highest
immediately after a shock hits the economy, when the distance between the desired
and actual levels of employment is largest. This prediction seems inconsistent with the
hump-shaped impulse responses that are typically estimated using structural VARs, as
discussed in the introduction.
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While we derived the exible accelerator property and its corollary that hiring peaks
on impact of a shock in a very specic and simple environment, these predictions are a
good deal more general than the assumptions of our model. If the cost function includes
elements of both non-convex and convex costs, i.e. functions that are in between the
extremesof xed and quadratic costs, if employment depreciates or if shocks are mean-
reverting, then it is generally not optimal to adjust to the frictionless optimal level of
employment. However, in all of these cases, hiring is still monotonic in the distance
between the current level and some desired level of employment, and these models
still predict that hiring peaks immediately after a shock.
2.4 A calibration target for persistence
In order to compare the dynamics of hiring in the model to those in the data, we would
ideally want to know the response of hiring to the distance between the current and
desired levels of employment. In general, it is not possible to estimate this response,
because the desired level of employment Nt is not observed. However, in the context
of our simple benchmark model, we can obtain an observable proxy. Using production
function (1) to eliminate technology At from expression (4), we see that in our model the
distance of employment from its desired level is log-proportional to labor productivity.
Nt
Nt
=

1  

Yt
Nt
1=
(7)
Thus, under the assumptions of our model, we can measure the response of hiring ht to
a change in technology by regressing the hiring rate on lags of labor productivity Yt=Nt.
A moving-average (MA) regression of the hiring rate on labor productivity provides
a simple and intuitive way to summarize the comovement of hiring with other macroeco-
nomic aggregates and is likely to be informative about the response of hiring to shocks.
The advantage of this regression over estimated impulse responses from a structural
VAR is that we do not have to take a stance on the type of shocks that drive changes
in the desired level of employment, which makes it a useful calibration target. An even
simpler target, like the autocorrelation of the hiring rate, would not be able to dis-
tinguish between persistence in hiring due to progation of the model and persistence
that is due to persistence in the shocks that drive business cycles. As a nal advantage
of our calibration target for the dynamics in hiring, we note that the logic of the ap-
proach extends to other variables, and in particular that the dynamics of investment can
be meaningfully summarized by a moving-average regression of investment on capital
productivity, see section 4.
It is important to note that the MA regression we propose does not recover the
impulse response function of hiring. Even in the context of our simple model, labor
productivity is endogenous, and we make no claim of causality in the regression. There
are two reasons for this. First, while many structural shocks will a¤ect the labor market
through labor productivity (technology shocks, but also monetary policy shocks and
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other consumption demand shocks), other shocks will not. In particular, to the extent
that the response of hiring to exogenous changes in labor supply is di¤erent from its
response to other shocks, this will not be captured by our regression. Second, exten-
sions to our simple model may break the link between the desired level of employment
and labor productivity. For example, if wages strongly comove with productivity, for
instance because workers have strong bargaining power in wage negotiations, then the
 in expression (7) will be a function of labor productivity, partially o¤setting the e¤ect
of productivity on the desired level of employment. Our claim is that while our moving-
average regression does not equal any impulse response function, it will be informative
about it, and we support this claim by showing below that the regression inherits many
of the properties of the response of hiring to identied structural shocks to technol-
ogy and monetary policy. In particular, the estimates show a clear hump shape in the
dynamics of hiring.
In the next subsection, we use our moving-average measure to compare the dynamics
of hiring implied by the model with those in the data.
2.5 The persistence puzzle
Figure 1 shows the dynamics of hiring (job nding rate), as measured by a moving-
average regression of the hiring rate ht on labor productivity Yt=Nt in the model with
adjustment costs in employment and in the data.3 Our measure for the dynamics of
hiring in the model closely mirrors the impulse response of hiring to a technology shock,
and in particular inherits its property that hiring is largest upon impact of the shock.
With quadratic adjustment costs, hiring peaks when productivity changes and then
slowly reverts to zero.
In the data, hiring peaks more than two years after the distance between the desired
and current levels of employment is largest. This is consistent with the hump-shaped
impulse responses for hiring found in structural VAR models with identied technology
(Canova, Lopez-Salido, and Michelacci (2010), Canova, Lopez-Salido, and Michelacci
(2013)) or monetary policy shocks (White (2018)). Our benchmark models with adjust-
ment costs cannot replicate this property.
The failure of standard models with adjustment costs to replicate the delayed re-
sponse in hiring observed in the data is what we call the persistence puzzle. In the next
section, we show how the model is able to match the observed dynamics in hiring if we
allow for a non-separable production technology, and that this result does not depend
on the specic form of adjustment costs.
3For the hiring rate, we use the job nding probability from Shimer (2012), and labor productivity
is output per worker from the BLS Labor Productivity and Costs program.
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3 Delayed adjustment
In this section, we introduce the main idea of this paper: with a non-separable production
function, the model predicts that hiring peaks not when a shock hits, but several periods
after. We label this property of the model delayed adjustment. Below, we rst examine
delayed adjustment in the context of the simple model from the previous section. In
section 5, we explore the quantitative importance of delayed hiring to match the data
with an extended version of that model.
3.1 Non-separable production technology
Standard production functions, like (1), are separable over time. Labor input in period t
contributes to production in the same period, and current-period labor is the only labor
input in production. This is an extreme assumption that is unlikely to be satised. In
reality, many tasks that workers perform do not immediately generate production, e.g.
cleaning, maintenance, training or participating team meetings. Of course these tasks are
productive; surely productivity would decrease if the o¢ ce was never cleaned, machines
were not maintained, workers never learned anything new and no meetings were held
to coordinate between workers. However, the e¤ect of these tasks on production realize
in future periods and may last for a long time, so that they need to be performed only
infrequently.
We model the e¤ect of infrequent tasks on production by introducing an additional
state variable, which we label organizational capital. When workers perform organi-
zational, or infrequent, tasks their labor does not directly enter into the production
function but is used to accumulate organizational capital. Organizational capital en-
ters into the production function and depreciates when no workers invest into it by
performing organizational tasks. This gives rise to the production function,
Yt = At (etNt)
1  + (1  )BtLt (8)
where Lt is the stock of organizational capital, which evolves according to,
Lt = (1  )Lt 1 + ~ ((1  et)Nt)
1 
 (9)
where et is the fraction of total labor input that is used for regular productive activi-
ties, which is a new choice variable,  is a parameter governing the relative importance
of current production versus organizational tasks, Bt represents shocks to the produc-
tivity of labor in producing organizational capital and -like At- is normalized to have
mean 1. As in the simple model, we will analyze the response of hiring to a one-time,
unexpected and permanent change in At, keeping Bt = 1 xed for most of the analy-
sis. The parameter  denotes the rate of depreciation or organizational capital and
~ =

(r + ) =
 
(1 + r)1 
1= is a correction factor to undo the e¤ect of  on the rel-
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ative importance of organizational tasks versus current productive activities.4 Finally, 
is a parameter measuring diminishing returns to organizational tasks in the production
versus the use of organizational capital. We would expect  to lie between 1   , in
which case the diminishing returns to organizational capital in production are the same
as for regular labor but there are no diminishing returns in the production of organiza-
tional capital, and 1, which implies diminishing returns to organizational tasks in the
production of organizational capital but no diminishing returns to organizational capital
in the production of output.
The production technology described by equations (8) and (9) stays as close as possi-
ble to a standard production function while allowing for intertemporal non-separability
in production. We assume that the only di¤erence between regular productive tasks and
organizational tasks is that the e¤ect of organizational tasks on production is spread out
over a long time period. How long this period is, is determined by the depreciation rate
of organizational capital . Production function (8) reduces to (1) not only for  = 1
(no role for organizational capital in production), but also for  = 1 (organizational
tasks, like regular productive activities, a¤ect production in the current period only),
up to a normalization of the productivity shock.5 In the frictionless optimal steady
state, the two types of labor enter into the production function symmetrically, and the
only di¤erence is their relative productivity At= (1  )Bt, see equation (11) below.
Our nal assumption on the production function, and the only one that is not justied
by symmetry, is additive separability, implying that output produced using regular la-
bor is perfectly substitutable with output produced using organizational capital. This
assumption is for simplicity, and we will show in section 5 that it is not qualitatively
important for our results.
The non-separable production technology provides rms with a storage technology
for labor, in the form of organizational capital. This storage technology allows them to
intertemporally smooth labor input and adds an additional margin of labor adjustment:
by postponing organizational tasks and reallocating labor to daily productive activities
rms can temporarily increase output without increasing labor input. Below, we explore
how this additional margin of adjustment changes the dynamics of hiring.
3.2 Optimal hiring policy
As before, the optimal hiring policy depends on the specication for adjustment costs,
and we analyze the same two cases as in section 2 above: xed and quadratic costs.
We show that a non-separable production technology introduces delay in the optimal
4Notice that ~ = 1 if  = 1 and ~ !  for r ! 0. The reason that ~ 6=  in general is due to the
di¤erence between the steady state and the static optimum allocation.
5With  = 1 production is given by Yt = At (etNt)
1  + (1  )Bt ((1  et)Nt)1 . Since
the production function is now separable over time, the fraction of workers allocated to each type
of labor et will be chosen statically to maximize production in each period, so that et satises
Ate
 
t = (1  )Bt (1  et) . Substituting the optimal et into the production function gives
Yt = Ate
 
t N
1 
t = ~AtN
1 
t , where ~At =
h
(At)
1= + ((1  )Bt)1=
i
.
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response of hiring, and that this happens for both specications for adjustment costs.
The planner still maximizes the expected net present value of prots, as in (3), but
she now has an additional choice variable et, the fraction of labor to allocate to regular
productive versus organizational tasks.
max
fet;htg1t=0
1X
t=0

1
1 + r
t
[Yt   Nt   g (ht)] (10)
where Yt is given by production function (8), subject to the laws of motion for employ-
ment (2) and organizational capital (9).
It is again useful as a benchmark to solve for the frictionless allocation. Setting
g (ht) = 0, maximizing (10) over et and Nt, and assuming that the organizational capital
was in steady state before technology changed, we nd that the frictionless optimal level
of employment Nt = N is constant over time and given by,
N =

(1  )A

1=
+

(1  ) (1  )B

1=
(11)
with eN = ((1  )A=)1= workers are allocated to regular productive activities
and the remaining (1  e)N working on organizational tasks, see appendix B.1 for
the derivation.
3.2.1 Fixed adjustment costs
With xed adjustment costs, g (h) =  for h 6= 0 and g (0) = 0, and a standard
separable production function, rms either adjust employment (hire or re some workers)
in response to a change in technology or they do not, depending on the size of the shock,
see lemma 1. With a non-separable production function, a third option arises: rms may
choose not to adjust employment immediately, but to do so after a delay. Delaying is
optimal in response to shocks of intermediate size, as described in proposition 3.
Proposition 3 With xed adjustment costs, the optimal hiring policy in response to an
improvement in technology in the employment adjustment problem described by equations
(3) and (2) and a non-separable production technology described by (8) and (9) depends
on the distance of employment Nt 1 from its frictionless optimal level Nt , as in equation
(11), as well as on time, and can be characterized as follows:
1. It is optimal to neither hire nor re if Nt  Nt 1 is su¢ ciently close to zero;
2. It is optimal to hire Nt   Nt 1 workers if Nt   Nt 1 is su¢ ciently positive and
to re Nt 1  Nt workers if Nt  Nt 1 is su¢ ciently negative;
3. It is optimal to hire Nt   Nt 1 workers or Nt 1   Nt workers after a delay if
Nt  Nt 1 is in an intermediate range.
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The proof of proposition 3 is given in appendix B.2. In broad strokes, the argument
runs as follows. If the planner does not immediately adjust employment in response to
a shock to technology, then she will reallocate some workers from organizational tasks
to current production to make up for the shortfall in labor input. Over time, this will
deplete the organizational capital stock and reduce production and prots, so that the
value of the planners program falls over time. Therefore, if Nt  Nt 1 is initially small
enough so that it is optimal not to hire workers immediately, but not too small, the
planner would eventually regret her decision not to hire. In this case, the policy to hire
Nt  Nt 1 after a delay dominates both the policy to immediately hire these workers and
the policy to never hire. The intuition is that by delaying hiring, the planner also delays
the payment of the hiring costs  , which because of discounting has a rst-order positive
e¤ect increasing prots by r . Since the organizational capital stock was initially at its
optimal level, the fall in Lt has only a second-order e¤ect on prots, so that the benets
exceed the costs of delaying.
The length of the delay increases with adjustment costs  and decreases with the
size of the shock. For very large shocks it is still optimal to immediately adjust employ-
ment whereas for very small shocks it is still optimal to never adjust, as in the case of
a separable production technology described in lemma 1. The length of the delay also
increases with the discount rate, which increases the incentive for delaying the adjust-
ment costs, and decreases with the depreciation rate of organizational capital, which
determines how fast the organizational capital stock depletes when the planner starts
underinvesting in it. This last parameter will be important as a lever to match the data,
see section 5 below.
3.2.2 Quadratic adjustment costs
With convex adjustment costs, g (h) = 12 h
2, and a standard separable production
function, hiring jumps in response to a change in technology, and then slowly and
monotonically declines to zero as employment approaches its frictionless optimal level,
see lemma 2. With a non-separable production technology, hiring still only jumps on
impact of the shock, and eventually declines to zero as employment approaches the
frictionless optimal. However, the decline in hiring need not be monotonic. For a
relevant range of parameter values, hiring rst increases after the shock before starting
to decrease and declining to zero, as described in proposition 4. Thus, peak hiring
happens after a delay.
Proposition 4 With quadratic adjustment costs, the optimal hiring policy in response
to a change in technology in the employment adjustment problem described by equations
(3) and (2) and a non-separable production technology described by (8) and (9) has the
following properties:
1. Hiring (or ring) starts immediately and continues for all periods after the shock,
eventually approaching zero as employment Nt approaches its desired level Nt as
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in (11); and
2. Hiring (ring) is delayed, in the sense that it rst increases after its initial jump,
then peaks, and nally declines over time, if the discount rate r > 0, adjustment
costs  > 0, the relative importance of organizational capital in production 1  2
[0; 1] are su¢ ciently high, and the depreciation rate of organizational capital  2
[0; 1] and diminishing returns in organizational capital  2 [1  ; 1] are su¢ ciently
low.
3. If the parameter conditions for delayed adjustment are satisied, then the amount
and length of delay (the di¤erence between peak hiring and initial hiring) increases
with the discount rate r > 0, adjustment costs  > 0 and the relative importance
of organizational capital 1   2 [0; 1], and decreases with the depreciation rate of
organizational capital  2 [0; 1].
The proof of proposition 4 is a straightforward application of dynamical systems,
and is implemented numerically, see appendix B.3. The intuition for the result can be
seen from the Euler equation for hiring,
ht =

 

e
et
N
Nt

  1

+
1
1 + r
ht+1 ' 
 

e   et
e
+
N  Nt
N

+
1
1 + r
Etht+1 (12)
which may be compared with the Euler equation (6) for the model with separable pro-
duction technology. With a non-separable production technology, the urgency of hiring
or ring is no longer summarized by the deviation of employment from its desired level
N Nt, but depends also on the fraction of labor that is optimally allocated to current
production e et, which in turn depends on the state of organization in the rm. If the
organizational capital stock was at its optimal steady state level before an unexpected
increase in technology, then it still is after the shock hits. Therefore, it is initially cost-
less for rms to disinvest in organization, reallocating workers from organizational to
current productive tasks. This reduces the incentive for hiring. Over time, however,
organizational capital gets depleted, which negatively a¤ects production and prots.
When this happens, more workers are allocated to organizational tasks again, and rms
need to hire more workers to achieve the desired level of output.
As in the case of xed costs, the length of the delay increases with adjustment costs
 and the discount rate r, both of which increase the incentive to postpone incurring
the adjustment costs, and decrease with the depreciation rate of organizational capital
, which determines how fast underinvestment in organizational tasks leads to a decline
in the organizational capital stock. Di¤erent from the xed-costs case, the length of
delay does not depend on the size of the shock and the predictions of the model change
very little when we linearize the equilibrium conditions.
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3.3 Persistence in hiring
The optimal hiring policy with a non-separable production technology is summarized in
gure 2, which shows the response of hiring to an increase in technology for xed and
quadratic adjustment cost. While the hiring policy looks quite di¤erent depending on
the specication of adjustment costs, the optimal policy in both cases involves delay, in
the sense that either all or most hiring takes place later than the impact of the shock.
While delayed adjustment in the model with non-convex adjustment costs is a non-
linear e¤ect, which depends on the size of the shock, this is not the case for the model
with convex adjustment costs. With convex adjustment costs, whether there is delayed
adjustment depends on parameters. In this model, we can linearize the equilibrium
conditions without qualitatively a¤ecting the dynamics, which greatly facilitates incor-
porating non-separabilities into larger-scale macroeconomic models.
If rm-level dynamics are well described by a model with xed adjustment costs,
then aggregate dynamics may look like the dynamics predicted by a model with convex
costs in our framework. In a model with heterogeneous rms and xed adjustment costs,
in response to an aggregate shock some rms will adjust employment immediately, some
will never adjust employment and some will adjust after a delay, see proposition 3.
Therefore, we would expect aggregate hiring to jump on impact of the shock, and then
to continue while more and more rms adjust. Depending on the distribution of rm
heterogeneity, as well as other model parameters, aggregate hiring may be monotonically
decreasing after the shock, or may peak after a delay, just as in the case of quadratic
adjustment costs, see proposition 4. This result echoes the aggregation result in Thomas
(2002) and Khan and Thomas (2008) for models with standard separable production
technology.
The intuition for why delayed adjustment may be optimal in our model is straightfor-
ward. The non-separable production technology, in particular the slow-moving organiza-
tional capital stock, acts as a storage (or smoothing) technology for labor. This storage
technology provides rms with an intensive margin for labor adjustment: rms may
postpone organizational tasks and reallocate workers to current productive activities,
e¤ectively borrowing labor from the future. Using this intensive margin immediately
increases production and therefore prots. And the intensive margin is initially costless,
because the organizational capital stock is slow to depreciate, and remains at its current
level even when organizational investment drops. Eventually, however, the borrowed
labor needs to be paid back. The (slow) depreciation of the organizational capital stock
negatively a¤ects production and prots, and this cost increases over time, so that the
rm is forced to allocate more workers to organizational tasks again. Having exhausted
the intensive margin of adjustment, rms must then turn to the extensive margin and
hire more workers.
The type of delay predicted by our model is endogenous, in the sense that delayed
adjustment is optimal in response to a single shock, even if no further shocks hit the
economy. This makes it di¤erent from the delay discussed e.g. in Dixit and Pindyck
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(1994) in the context of investment, and used e.g. in Bachmann (2012) in the context
of employment, which we might call exogenous delay. In a model with non-convex
adjustment costs, but with a separable production technology, as in these studies, a
rm may choose not to respond to a shock while it is waiting for new information
(Dixit and Pindyck (1994, p.9)), i.e. to take a wait and seeapproach (Schreft, Singh,
and Hodgson (2005)). However, new information in this context means new shocks. If
those new shocks are such as to further increase the benets of adjustment, then the
rm may decide to adjust after a delay. However, if the new shocks revert the e¤ect of
the rst shock, then adjustment may never happen. In our model with a non-separable
production technology, on the other hand, delayed adjustment will happen in response
to some shocks, but it does not happen immediately. The distinction is important,
because estimated impulse responses from a VAR, if correctly identied, describe the
response of the economy to a single shock. Therefore, only a model with endogenously
delayed adjustment can explain the hump shapes in the estimated response of hiring.
We will turn to the quantitative implications of our model in section 5 below, but
rst take a brief detour into the dynamics of capital and investment in the next section.
4 The dynamics of capital and investment
The impulse response of capital investment to technology and monetary policy shocks,
like that of hiring, shows a clear hump-shape (Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Linde
(2011)). For this reason, the DSGE literature often assumes so called cost-of-change
adjustment costs, i.e. costs that are quadratric in the change in investment it rather
than its level, g (it; it 1) = 12 (it=it 1)
2 (Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005),
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Trabandt (2018)). In this section, we argue that standard
leveladjustment costs, g (it) = 12 i
2
t , in combination with a non-separable production
technology, give rise to very similar dynamics as cost-of-change adjustment costs with
a standard separable production technology. We show that the persistence puzzle we
documented for hiring in section 2.5 holds for investment as well, and argue that, since
the model is symmetric in capital and labor, our results for the dynamics of hiring with
a non-separable production function apply equally to investment in a model with xed
labor.
The model in sections 2 and 3 assumed that production requires only labor. In order
to focus on the dynamics of investment, we can make the opposite extreme assumption
that production requires only capital Kt. Then, the simple production function (1)
would be replaced by Yt = AtKt , where  2 (0; 1) is the capital share, whereas if we
allow for intertemporal non-separability, production function (8) becomes
Yt = At (utKt)
 + (1  )BtLt (13)
and
Lt = (1  )Lt 1 + ~ ((1  ut)Kt)

 (14)
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where all parameters have the same interpretation as before and ut is the fraction of the
capital stock that is used for current production, with 1   ut of capital being used for
investing in organizational or intangible capital. Perhaps the easiest way to interpret
1  ut is as the fraction of machines that are shut down for maintenance. The planner
may adjust the capital stock by investing or disinvesting in it, Kt = Kt 1 + it.
This model for capital adjustment is almost completely symmetric to the model for
labor adjustment, with the capital share  playing the role of the labor share 1    in
that model, except that the way investment a¤ects prots is slightly di¤erent from the
way hiring does. Maintaining the same assumptions of linear utility and competitive
markets as before, the planner maximizes the expected net present value of prots,
max
fitg1t=0
1X
t=0

1
1 + r
t
[Yt   it   g (it)] (15)
The di¤erence with the labor adjustment model is that investment in capital lowers
prots, whereas the stock of labor reduces prots (or utility) in objective function (3).
The Euler equation for investment in this model, is given by
it =
r
(1 + r) 
 
u
ut
K
Kt
1 
  1
!
+
1
1 + r
it+1 (16)
where ut = u = 1 if  = 1 or  = 1, see appendix C for the derivation. Comparing
this equation to Euler equation for hiring (12), it is clear that the model for capital
adjustment model is symmetric to the one for labor adjustment under a parameter
restriction on the value of leisure in that model,  = r= (1 + r).
The symmetry between the models for capital and labor adjustment allows us to
extend our results for hiring dynamics to investment.
The desired capital stock is log-proportional to capital productivity for  = 1,
Kt
Kt
=

 (1 + r)
r
Yt
Kt
1=(1 )
(17)
see appendix C and compare to (7). Therefore, a regression of log investment on an MA
for log capital productivity is a meaningful summary of the persistence in investment,
see the discussion in section 2.4. The bottom panel in gure 1 shows the dynamics of
investment in the data (private non-residential xed investment, net of consumption
of xed capital, from the NIPA), as well as in the model with a standard separable
production function ( = 1). The gure documents a persistence puzzle for investment,
which is very similar as the puzzle for hiring that we documented earlier, although
less severe. In the model, investment monotonically declines after the initial impact of
the shock, whereas in the data the response is hump-shaped and peaks only after 5-8
quarters (compared to 8-12 quarters for hiring).
A non-separable production function brings the dynamics of investment closer to the
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data.
Proposition 5 The optimal investment policy in response to a change in technology in
the capital adjustment problem described by equation (15) and a non-separable produc-
tion technology described by (13) and (14) exhibits delayed adjustment, both for xed
adjustment costs and for quadratic adjustment costs, as described in propositions 3, and
4 replacing hiring with investment and employment with capital.
Qualitatively, a non-separable production technology can explain the peristence puz-
zle in hiring as well as in investment. Whether this mechanism is su¢ cient to match the
data is a quantitative question, to which we now turn. Since production in macroeco-
nomic models usually requires both labor and capital, there is an additional quantitative
question whether the model can match the persistence in both hiring and investment
for the same parameter values.
5 Persistence in macroeconomic models
We showed that in a simple model with non-separable production technology the opti-
mal policy for hiring and investment involves delayed adjustment. In this section, we
argue that this delay is quantitatively relevant, in the sense that it brings the model
dynamics substantially closer to the data. As a by-product, we also show that the result
goes through if there are adjustment costs in both capital and labor and if we extend
the model in other dimensions to make it more similar to the type of DSGE models
typically used in the literature. The main quantitative exercise is to calibrate the model
parameters to the literature as much as possible, and then to evaluate whether there
exist values for the free parameters describing the non-separability in production, that
generate peristence in hiring and investment as observed in the data. In section 6 we
think about whether the parameters we need are reasonable, and whether we can nd
additional evidence to test our story.
5.1 Quantitative analysis
We use the following production technology for output using labor and capital,
Yt =



At (utKt)
 (etNt)
1 
 1

+ (1  ) (BtLt )
 1

 
 1
(18)
where organizational capital Lt evolves according to,
Lt = (1  )Lt 1 + ~ ((1  ut)Kt)

 ((1  et)Nt)
1 
 (19)
which is a straightforward extension of (8) and (13). There are only two new parame-
ters: , which measures decreasing returns to scale in production, and , the elasticity of
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substitution between current production and organizational capital. We need decreas-
ing returns, because otherwise the model (with linear utility) does not have a steady
state. Decreasing returns arise for instance if rms are monopolistically competitive
and face elastic demand for their product, as in a standard new Keynesian model.6 We
assume technology At is stochastic and follows an exogenous Markov process, and keep
the technology for organizational capital production Bt xed at unity for most of the
analysis.
There are adjustment costs in both labor and capital. Consistent with the literature,
we let the adjustment cost functions be quadratic in the relative adjustment, i.e. in
hiring and investment as a fraction of employment and capital respectively, so that
gN (ht) =
1
2 N (ht=Nt)
2 and gK (it) = 12 K (it=Kt)
2. Furthermore, we assume that the
stocks of both employment and capital depreciate,
Nt = (1  N )Nt 1 +Ht = Nt 1 + ht (20)
Kt = (1  K)Kt 1 + It = Kt 1 + it (21)
where N is the separation rate and K is the depreciation rate for physical capital.
Notice that our timing assumptions imply that depreciated employment and capital
may be reinstalled within the period, so that N and K are gross depreciation rates.
Also note that we assume that adjustment costs depend on hiring ht and investment it
net of replacement hiring/investment, rather than on total hiring Ht and investment It.
We maintain the assumption that utility is linear, but we allow for a preference shock
as a stand-in for all non-technology shocks. Thus, we assume that per-period welfare
is given by Zt [Yt   It   gN (ht)  gK (it)]   Nt, where Zt is stochastic and follows an
exogenous Markov process that is independent of At. This second shock brings the
correlation matrix of the model variables closer in line with data by breaking the almost-
perfect comovement between variables in a one-shock model, and is also needed to help
a simple RBC models like ours match the relative volatility of labor market variables,
hiring and employment. The equilibrium conditions for the quantitative model are listed
in appendix D.
The calibration of the model is summarized in table 1. For most of the parameters,
we choose values that are commonly used in the literature. In this spirit, we calibrate the
quarterly discount rate r to 3% to match the average return on equity, the capital share
 to 0:33,  = 0:87 to match the markup of 12:5% of a monopolistically competitive rm
(Galí (2015, p.67)), choose a depreciation rate for capital K of 2:5% (King and Rebelo
(1999b)), a (gross) separation rate N of 30% per quarter (Gali and van Rens (2020)), and
calibrate the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure  to match
the average employment population ratio N = 0:7. We set the autocorrelation of At to
match the corresponding parameter for total factor productivity in the data, normalize
6Maximizing prots PtCt costs(Ct) subject to the demand equation Ct =constP "t , Pt = C 1="t
is equivalent to maximizing C(" 1)="t  costs(Ct). In this example,  = ("  1) =".
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the standard deviation of innovations in At to 1% and set the stochastic process for Zt
equal to that for At, loosely based on the estimates in Smets and Wouters (2007, Table
1B) showing that the autocorrelations and standard deviations of non-technology shocks
are in the same order of magnitude as those of technology shocks.
The parameters , ,  and , which describe the non-separability in the produc-
tion technology are specic to our model and consequently there is no guidance in the
literature on how to calibrate these parameters. In our quantitative exercise, we treat
these as free parameters and explore how they a¤ect the prediction of the model for
the dynamics of hiring and investment. Since there are few direct estimates of adjust-
ment costs, the literature often sets these parameters to match a volatility target. We
follow this practice and set adjustment costs for employment  N , together with , ,
 and , to match the response of hiring. We then treat the response of investment
as an overidentifying restriction, setting the adjustment costs for capital equal to those
for employment,  K =  N , and evaluate the performance of the model to match the
response of investment for the same parameter values that we calibrated to the response
of hiring.
5.2 The dynamics of hiring and investment
Figure 3 shows the model impulse responses employment, hiring, and capital and in-
vestment for the model with a separable and a non-separable production technology.
The three lines in this gure correspond to increasing shares of organizational capital in
production: 0 (separable production function), 15% (the calibrated baseline) and 30%.
The model with a non-separable production function can replicate the hump-shaped
impulse responses for hiring and investment, and the length of the delay increases in the
share of organizational capital in production. Thus, the results we proved in sections
3 and 4 hold for a more general model, in which production requires both capital and
labor, with a standard calibration for the parameters.
Next, we ask the question whether we can nd parameters for the production tech-
nology so that the dynamics of hiring and investment match the persistence observed
in the data. As a summary measure of the dynamics of hiring and investment, we use
MA regressions of these variables on labor and capital productivity respectively, as in-
troduced in sections 2.5 and 4. We vary parameters , , ,  and  N and for each set
of values for these parameters recalibrate the other parameters to match their targets,
simulate the model and run the same regression we ran on the actual data on the model-
simulated data. We look for parameter values that minimize the distance between the
estimated response of hiring from the data and the model. The results of this exercise
are presented in gure 4, and the values for , ,  and  we used for these gures are
reported in table 1.
It is clear from gure 4 that the model has no trouble replicating the persistence in
hiring observed in the data, and it also gets close to matching the responses of investment
with the same parameter values, even though we did not target this response in the
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calibration. Hiring responds little initially and peaks after just over two years in the
data, whereas investment jumps more on impact but peaks around the same time as
hiring. The calibrated model matches the response of hiring almost perfectly. The model
also gets close to matching the amount of delay (0:39 in the model as well as in the data)
and the lenth of the delay (8 quarters in the model versus 7 in the data), even though
we did not target this response in the calibration.
The share of organizational capital we need to assume in order to match the hiring
dynamics observed in the data is 1   u = 1   e = 15%, corresponding to  = 0:56,
see table 1. Organizational capital is slightly less persistent than physical capital, with
a depreciation rate of 2:7%. In section 6 below, we discuss some evidence on whether
these are reasonable parameter values and try to nd ways to test our story.
5.3 Robustness
The non-standard element in our model is the production technology, and this is where
we focus our robustness analysis. We start with varying the parameters , which mea-
sures the importance of organizational capital in production, and , its depreciation
rate, which have the expected e¤ect on the results. These and all other results discussed
in this subsection are reported in table 2.
We then consider the elasticity of substitution between current production and or-
ganizational capital , which is qualitatively important for the predictions of the model.
For an increase in productivity to have a positive e¤ect on the fraction of workers et
allocated to current production,  needs to be su¢ ciently greater than one. The reason
is that for smaller values of  an increase in technology At a¤ects the productivity of
organizational capital production just as much as or even more than that of current
productive activities. If we set Bt = At, then varying  leaves the impulse responses
virtually unaltered, suggesting that it is not the degree of substitutability that is impor-
tant, but the e¤ect of changes in At on the relative productivity of current production
over organizational investments. Thus, we need to think of a boom as a period of high
relative productivity of current production. Organizational investments are no more
productive in a boom than in a recession. Then, because capital and labor are overall
more valuable, rms will substitute organizational investments for productive inputs in
a boom and vice versa in a recession.
Next, we turn to the symmetry in the production function between labor and capital.
In the simple model with only labor in section 3, it was relatively straightforward to
justify our non-separable production technology in equations (8) and (9) as the smallest
possible deviation from a standard separable production function as in (1). But in
the full model with both labor and capital, as in (18) and (19), further assumptions
were required, importantly the assumption that the capital and labor shares in current
productive activities are the same as in organizational capital production. Relaxing this
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assumption, we replace equation (19) with
Lt = (1  )Lt 1 + ~ ((1  ut)Kt)
L
 ((1  et)Nt)
1 L
 (22)
We start from the extreme case that organizational capital production requires only
labor, L = 0, and gradually increase the capital share in organizational capital pro-
duction. As we may have expected, the model is able to generate delay in investment
only if it requires capital.
Finally, we explore the robustness of our results if we assume adjustment costs over
gross rather than net hiring, Ht = ht + NNt 1, and investment, It = it + KKt 1. In
this case, the model is still able to generate delayed adjustment, see table 2, and the
amount of delay is only slightly lower.
6 Evidence and implications
We showed that an otherwise standard macroeconomic model with a non-separable
production technology can match the persistence in hiring and investment observed
in the data, because the non-separability creates an additional margin of adjustment
that rms may use to increase factor inputs into current production by postponing
other types of activities. The most direct evidence for this mechanism comes from a,
somewhat dated, survey by Fay and Medo¤ (1985). In this survey, plant managers were
asked how many workers they had been forced to let go in the previous recession, and
how many they could have red while still meeting production requirements. The results
showed that there was labor hoarding in the amount of 6% of workers, who were not
needed during the recession but who had nevertheless not been laid o¤. Importantly
for this paper, the survey then asked managers to indicate how they employed these
extra workers. The answers indicated that these workers were assigned to other
work, including (in order of frequency) cleaning, painting, maintenance of equipment,
equipment overhaul, or sent on training. In the context of our model, these types of
other work can all be considered organizational tasks, because they do not a¤ect
production immediately, but are likely to improve productivity in the longer run. The
estimate of 6% lines up well with our calibrated model, which predicts a decrease in et
of 6:2% in the rst year (from 12% in the rst quarter to 2% in the fourth quarter) after
a one-standard-deviation shock.
We model non-separabilities production as an additional state variable, which we
label organizational capital, because there is evidence that organization is important
in economics: for the existence of rms (Prescott and Visscher (1980)), to explain the
large drop in output in the transition from a planned to a market economy (Blanchard
and Kremer (1997)), for understanding the link between information technology and
skill-biased technological change (Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000)), for stock market value
(Lev, Radhakrishnan, and Zhang (2009), Hall (2000a)), for asset returns (Eisfeldt and
Papanikolaou (2013)), and it is often meaningful to think of organization as a stock of
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capitalthat positively a¤ects productivity (Hall (2000b)). Organizational or intangi-
ble capital has also been shown to be important for measured productivity and business
cycles (McGrattan and Prescott (2010), McGrattan and Prescott (2012), McGrattan
(2017)), for optimal taxation (Conesa and Domínguez (2013), Conesa and Dominguez
(2018)), and for the rise in the relative volatility of labor market variables (Mitra (2019)).
This o¤ers further opportunities for testing the model, building on a literature trying
to measure organizational capital.
An ideal test of our explanation would compare the predictions of our model for the
dynamics of (investments in) organizational capital directly to the data. This requires
good estimates of organizational capital, at su¢ ciently high frequency and over a su¢ -
ciently long time period. Since such an idea test is not feasible due to lack of data, we
try to build our case based on a compendium of indirect evidence. In subsection 6.1, we
discuss some of the attempts to measure organizational capital, and show that the esti-
mated share of organization in production is roughly in line with what our model needs
to match the data on persistence in hiring and investment. Section 6.2 uses capacity
utilization as an observable proxy for allocation of labor and capital to production versus
organization, and shows that its dynamics are consistent with the dynamics predicted
by our model. Finally, we attempt a test of our mechanism by checking whether di¤er-
ences in organizational capital line up with di¤erences in persistence across industries
(in subsection 6.3) and over time (in subsection 6.4).
6.1 Organizational capital share in production
Although measuring organizational capital is far from straightforward (Lev, Radhakrish-
nan, and Zhang (2009)), the literature has made a number of strong attempts. Atkeson
and Kehoe (2005) estimate a structural model based on Prescott and Visscher (1980)
and nd that 8% of output is due to intangibles. Hall (2000a) uses a weight of 9%
for e-capital in production and nd that accumulation of e-capital contributed 15%
to productivity growth over the 1990-98 period. Black and Lynch (2005) argue that
employer-provided training is an important component of organizational investments
and more easily measured, and nd that 30% of output growth is due to workplace
practices, mostly training. The sources-of-growth analysis by Corrado, Hulten, and
Sichel (2009) considers investments in IT and training, but also R&D and advertising
and nd an income share of 15% due to intangibles in 2000-03, with growth in the share
of intangibles contributing 27% to growth in labor productivity from 1995 to 2003. Fi-
nally, Squicciarini and Mouel (2012) develop a measure of organizational investments
in organization by using O*Net to identify occupations, in which workers perform tasks
that are classied as organizational: organising, planning and prioritising work; building
teams, matching employees to tasks, and providing training; supervising and coordi-
nating activities; communicating across and within groups. They nd that over 20% of
employees work primarily on organizational tasks, double the estimates used in Corrado,
Hulten, and Sichel (2009).
24
There seems to be broad consensus in this empirical literature that the share of
organizational capital in output is somewhere between 8 and 20%, and that accumulation
of organizational capital accounts for a much larger contribution to growth in output
and productivity. We nd that in order to match the observed persistence in hiring and
investment with our model, we need to assume that 15% of labor and capital are being
used for organizational tasks in steady state, well in line with these estimates. Since
we did not target the organizational capital share, nor any of the series that are used
to estimate it, but instead calibrated it to the response of hiring and investment, we
interpret this as evidence in favor of our model.
6.2 The dynamics of factor input allocation
Our model has strong predictions for the dynamics of factor input allocation. Reallo-
cating workers and capital services from current production to organization acts as an
intensive margin of adjustment that makes it possible for rms to delay adjusting labor
and capital. As a consequence, we would expect factor allocation to respond immedi-
ately when a shock hits the rm, and the response of et and ut should not show a hump
shape. To test this prediction, we need an empirical counterpart of et or ut.
There is little direct evidence on the allocation of workers or capital within a rm,
beyond the one-time survey by Fay and Medo¤ (1985). Empirical measures of orga-
nizational investment are of limited use as well, because they are available at best an
annual frequency and for relatively short periods. We argue that capacity utilization is
a good measure for et and ut, as it measures changes in (current) output that cannot
be explained by changes in factor inputs. Basu, Fernald, and Kimball (2006) argue
that changes in hours-per-worker are a good proxy for changes in both labor e¤ort and
capital utilization, and Fernald (2012) provides a long quarterly time series for capacity
utilization based on this idea, which we use to test the predictions of our model for the
dynamics of et and ut.7
In gure 5, we show the result of the same MA regression on productivity for capacity
utilization as we showed for hiring and investment in gure 1. The response of utilization
to changes in the economy is immediate, without evidence for a delayed response as for
hiring or investment, consistent with the predictions of our model. This is further
evidence in favor of the mechanism proposed in this paper.
6.3 Cross-industry evidence
The response of sectoral investment to macroeconomic shocks is hump-shaped, just as
in aggregate data (Zorn (2016)). This nding implies that the delayed response of
investment in aggregate data is not due to a composition e¤ect but to a mechanism that
operates within-industries. Therefore, we can use the variation in the response of hiring
7Alternative proxies we considered are e¤ort (Shea (1990)) and skill acquisition (DeJong and Ingram
(2001), Dellas and Sakellaris (2003)). While the cyclicality of these measures is consistent with our
model as well, the data are annual, which makes it di¢ cult to estimate the dynamics precisely.
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(and investment) across industries to provide some further evidence for the mechanism
we propose in this paper.
We explore to what extent the response of hiring and investment to shocks across
industries is correlated with various measures of organizational capital intensity. Our
model predicts that adjustment of employment and capital in industries with a higher
share of organizational capital should exhibit more delay. A range of measures of or-
ganizational or intangible capital intensity is available for the US at the industry level,
although at a relatively high level of aggregation: data on information capital intensity
as suggested by Brynjolfsson, Hitt, and Yang (2002) and provided by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics (2019a); data on intangible capital, organizational capital and training
intensity constructed using the perpetual inventory method from a broad range of invest-
ments, including things that are usually treated as intermediate costs in the NIPA, from
INTAN-Invest (Carol Corrado (2016)); a task-based measure of organizational invest-
ments produced by Squicciarini and Mouel (2012); data on e-capital from Hall (2000a);
and data on employer-provided training as suggested by Black and Lynch (2005) as
a measure for organizational capital and provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(2019b). We match these data to measures of delay in hiring and investment calculated
from the US KLEMS (Bureau of Labor Statistics (2019a)), see appendix E for a more
detailed description of the data and the measures for delay and organizational capital
intensity.
The correlations between delay in hiring and organizational capital intensity we nd
tend to be positive, ranging from 0:7 for the percentage of workers that received formal
training provided by their employer over the past year to zero for e-capital intensity,
see appendix E. Unfortunately, the number of industries at which the measures of
organizational capital intensity are provided is too low (between 8 and 28) to estimate
these correlations with any reasonable degree of certainty. We conclude that the cross-
industry evidence is at least not inconsistent with the explanation for delayed adjustment
proposed in this paper.
6.4 Jobless recoveries
There is evidence that persistence in the US economy substantially increased some time
in the 1980s. This change in business cycle dynamics has been documented in a small
literature on the emergence of so called jobless recoveries (Schreft and Singh (2003),
Aaronson, Rissman, and Sullivan (2004), Bachmann (2012), Jaimovich and Siu (2018))
or slow recoveries (Galí, Smets, and Wouters (2012)). When we run our MA regressions
for hiring on labor productivity and for investment on capital productivity separable for
the pre and post 1985 sample, it is clear that delays increased substantially over time,
particularly for hiring, see gures 6 and 7.
As a further test of our explanation for persistence, we ask if we can attribute
the increase in persistence to an increase in the importance of non-separabilities in
production. Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel (2009) document that the share of intangible
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capital in output increased by more than 50% from 1975 to 1995 (and then further
increased by over 30% from 1995 to 2015, see Carol Corrado (2016)). When we double
the share of organizational capital in our model, from 15% to 30%, we nd that the
length of the delay in hiring increases from 8 to 9 quarters, and the length of delay in
investment increases from 8 to 11 quarters, see table 2. These model predictions are
roughly consistent with the change in persistence in hiring and investment in the data,
see gures 6 and 7.
Compared to other explanations for the emergence of jobless recoveries (Bachmann
(2012), Koenders and Rogerson (2005), Berger (2012), Jaimovich and Siu (2018)), our
explanation is perhaps most similar to Koenders and Rogerson (2005), who also argue
that reorganizations will be postponed when productivity is relatively high. The main
di¤erence is that in the model in Koenders and Rogerson (2005), reorganization will be
postponed for as long as an expansion lasts, whereas in this paper postponing organi-
zational tasks is a temporary solution. Therefore, whereas their model can explain the
emergence of the jobless recoveries following the longer expansions since the 1980s, it
cannot match the hump-shaped impulse responses in hiring and investment, which were
the main motivation for this study.
7 Conclusions
We o¤ered an explanation for the hump-shaped impulse responses in hiring and invest-
ment in US data that relies on non-separabilities in production in combination with
standard adjustment costs in labor and capital. A non-separable production technology
means that rms can intertemporally substitute labor and capital, allowing them to ad-
just factor inputs without the need for hiring and investment or ring and disinvestment.
In combination with adjustment costs in labor and capital, this new intensive margin of
adjustment generates an incentive to postpone hiring and investment in response to a
shock, a feature of the model which we labelled delayed adjustment. Delayed adjustment
in our model is endogenous, i.e. adjustment eventually happens in response to a single
shock and does not require a specic sequence of shocks, nor does it depend on the spe-
cic type of adjustment costs (non-convex or convex). We discussed some evidence that
the organizational capital share in production the model needs to match the persistence
in hiring and investment observed in the data, is consistent with empirical estimates of
organizational and intangible capital.
Compared to the early literature on propagation (Cogley and Nason (1995); Rotem-
berg and Woodford (1996)), we draw a sharp distinction between the persistence in
stock and ow variables, arguing that whereas adjustment costs may explain persis-
tence and hump-shaped responses in the stocks (capital and employment), they cannot
by themselves account for persistence in the ows (investment and hiring). This is the
same observation that led Christiano (2011) to dismiss adjustment costs in capital as a
failed approach. Following Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), the literature
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has addressed the problem by assuming adjustment costs in the change in investment
rather than in capital, i.e. g (it; it 1) = 12 (it=it 1)
2 instead of g (it) = 12 i
2
t , see e.g.
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Trabandt (2018). We show that with a reasonably cali-
brated non-separable production technology, a model with standard adjustment costs
generates impulse responses that are very similar to a model with cost-of-change adjust-
ment costs.
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Parameter Target Value
Discount rate r S&P500 0:03
Capital share  RBC literature 0:33
Technology shock At persistence RBC literature 0:979
Technology At innovation std dev normalization 0:01
Preference shock Zt persistence same stochastic process as At 0:979
Preference Zt innovation std dev same stochastic process as At 0:01
Decreasing returns to scale  = " 1" markup 12:5% 0:87
Depreciation capital K RBC literature 0:025
Separation rate (gross) N data (CPS) 0:30
Disutility from working (wage)  empl-pop ratio N = 0:7 0:53
AC capital  K  K =  N in the baseline 40
AC employment  N hiring response 40
Diminishing returns to OC hiring response 0:97
Importance organization in production  hiring response 0:56
Depreciation organizational capital  hiring response 0:027
EOS current production and organization  hiring response 3:9
Table 1: Calibration
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Hiring Investment
amount
delay
length
delay
amount
delay
length
delay
Data (1948:Q1-2007:Q4) 0:89 8 0:39 7
 Pre-84 (1948:Q1-1984:Q4) 0:83 8 0:32 5
 Post-84 (1985:Q1-2007:Q4) 1:65 11 0:63 7
 = 1 (no OC, e = u = 1) 0:00 0 0:00 0
 = 0:56 (baseline, e = u = 1  0:15) 0:52 8 0:39 8
 = 0:5 (more OC, e = u = 1  0:30) 0:84 9 0:61 11
 = 0:015 (OC depreciates less) 0:84 9 0:64 11
 = 0:027 (baseline) 0:52 8 0:39 8
 = 3 (OC more complementary) 0:01 1 0:02 4
 = 3:9 (baseline) 0:52 8 0:39 8
 = 5 (OC more substitutable) 0:76 9 0:74 9
Bt = At,  = 3 (OC more complementary) 0:41 11 0:23 8
Bt = At,  = 3:9 0:58 12 0:50 10
Bt = At,  = 5 (OC more substitutable) 0:59 12 0:51 10
L = 0 (OC requires only labor) 0:81 10 0:00 0
L = 0:15 (OC requires more labor) 0:95 11 0:18 6
L =  = 0:33 (baseline) 0:52 8 0:39 8
L = 0:5 (OC requires less labor) 0:00 0 0:73 11
AC over gross hiring/investment 0:40 7 0:59 8
Table 2: Robustness analysis. The amount of delay is measured as peak minus impact
hiring or investment as a fraction of peak hiring/investment. The length of delay is the
di¤erence between the time of peak hiring/investment and the time of impact measured
in quarters.
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Figure 1: Persistence in hiring and investment in the data (black solid line with grey
standard error bands) and in a model with standard separable production function with
convex adjustment costs (red dashed line). The gure shows the coe¢ cients of an MA
regression of hiring ht on labor productivity (output per hour) Yt=Nt and investment it
on capital productivity Yt=Kt for the period from 1948:Q1 to 2007:Q4, and the response
over a simulated sample of the model over 100; 000 periods.
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Figure 2: Delayed hiring in a model with xed and quadratic adjustment costs.
0 5 10 15 20
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
Hiring
0 5 10 15 20
0.022
0.023
0.024
0.025
0.026
0.027
0.028
0.029
0.03
0.031
Investment
No organizational capital
Baseline Model ( =0.56)
Model with =0.5
Figure 3: Impulse response functions of the model with separable and non-separable
production technology,  = 1 (e = u = 1), 0:56 (e = u = 1   0:15) and 0:5 (e = u =
1  0:3).
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Figure 4: Persistence in hiring and investment in the data (black solid line with grey
standard error bands), in our baseline model (red line with diamonds), and in the model
without organizational capital (blue line with stars). The gure shows the coe¢ cients
of an MA regression of hiring Ht on labor productivity (output per worker) Yt=Nt and
investment It on capital productivity Yt=Kt for the period from 1948:Q1 to 2007:Q4,
and the response over a simulated sample of the model over 100; 000 periods.
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Figure 5: Persistence in capacity utilization. The gure shows the coe¢ cients of an MA
regression of capacity utilization on capital productivity Yt=Kt. Unlike for hiring and
investment, there is no evidence for delayed adjustment in utilization.
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Figure 6: The emergence of the slow and jobless recoveries. MA regression of hiring on
labor productivity before (blue diamonds) and after (red plusses) 1985.
Figure 7: The emergence of the slow recovery of investment. MA regression of investment
on capital productivity before (blue diamonds) and after (red plusses) 1985.
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1
A Proofs and derivations for separable production
A.1 Optimal hiring policy (5) with xed adjustment costs
The only state variable in our benchmark model is the level of employment inherited
from last period Nt 1, which evolves through hiring and ring as in law of motion (2).
Since we analyze a one-time permanent shock to technology, i.e. At+s = At for all s  0,
we treat the state of technology At as a parameter rather than a state variable. Let
V (Nt) denote the value of the planners program.
At time t, when the shock hits, the planner decides whether to adjust employment,
by hiring or ring some workers, or not. If she decides not to adjust, then the value
function evolves according to the following Bellman equation.
V (Nt 1) = AtN1 t 1   Nt 1 +
1
1 + r
V (Nt 1) (A.1)
This equation is readily solved explicitly for the value function
V (Nt 1) =
1
r
 
AtN
1 
t 1   Nt 1

(A.2)
for all periods from t onwards.
If the planner decides to adjust employment, then she pays the adjustment costs  .
The advantage is that she then gets to hire or re any number of workers in period t
to achieve a new level of employment. Since adjustment costs are independent on the
amount of hiring or ring, and given our assumption that the level of technology is
constant from period t onwards, it is clear that the planner will adjust employment to
the frictionless optimal level, i.e. ht = Nt  Nt 1. Therefore, the continuation value of
the program equals V (Nt )   in this case.
The planner decides to adjust employment or not in order to maximize the contin-
uation value of the program, i.e. she adjusts employment if V (Nt )    > V (Nt 1),
where V (:) as in (A.2).
V (Nt )  V (Nt 1) = AN1 t   Nt  AtN1 t 1 + Nt 1 > r (A.3)
The planner adjusts employment if the increase in the net present value of prots from
having the optimal level of employment instead of the current level exceeds the adjust-
ment costs. Using expression (4) for Nt to eliminate the level of technology At, the
condition for adjusting employment
1
r
"

1  
 
1 

Nt 1
Nt
1 !
  

1  Nt 1
Nt
#
>
 
Nt
(A.4)
depends only on the ratio of employment to its desired level Nt , adjustment costs as a
fraction of the desired level of employment and other model parameters.
Condition (A.4) can be used to prove the following properties of the optimal hiring
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policy:
1. For Nt 1 close to Nt , the planner does not adjust employment, because the limit
for Nt 1 ! Nt of the left-hand side of the condition equals zero, whereas the
right-hand side is strictly greater than zero.
2. For Nt 1 su¢ ciently large, it is optimal to hire some workers, because for Nt 1 !
1 the left-hand side of the condition tends to innity. ForNt 1 su¢ ciently small, it
is optimal to hire some workers if  < 1r
h
1
1 N

t   Nt
i
= 1r

AN1 t   Nt

,
i.e. if adjustment costs are smaller than the net present value of prots in the
frictionless optimum, a parameter restrictions which we assumed to be satised.
3. If it is optimal to adjust employment (hire) for Nt 1 < Nt , then it is also optimal
to adjust for N 0t 1 < Nt 1, because the derivative of the left-hand side of the
condition is negative if Nt 1 < Nt . Similarly, if it is optimal to adjust employment
(re) for Nt 1 > Nt , then it is also optimal to adjust for N 0t 1 > Nt 1, because
the derivative of the left-hand side of the condition is positive in this case.
Combining properties 1 and 2 and using that the left-hand side of condition (A.4) is
continuous in Nt 1 > 0, by the intermediate value theorem there exist values 0 <
bH (N

t ) < N

t and bF (N

t ) > 0 for any value of N

t , such that the planner is indi¤erent
between adjusting employment or not if Nt 1 = Nt  bH (Nt ) and Nt 1 = Nt +bF (Nt ).
By property 3, these bounds are unique, and it is optimal to hire if and only if Nt 1 <
Nt   bH (Nt ) and it is optimal to re workers if and only if Nt 1 < Nt + bF (Nt ). This
proves lemma 1 in the main text.
The adjustment process guarantees that employment Nt 1 will not deviate very far
from its frictionless optimal level Nt . Therefore, we can simplify condition (A.4) by
approximating it around Nt 1 = Nt .
 
Nt
<
1
r
"
1
2

Nt 1  Nt
Nt
2
+O
 
Nt 1  Nt
Nt
3!#
(A.5)
Note that the rst-order terms evaluate to zero, because Nt is the optimal level of
employment, so that V 0 (Nt ). Setting higher-order terms to zero and requiring that
this approximate condition holds with equality in the bounds, we get an approximate
expression for the bounds.
 
Nt
=
1
r
1
2

b (Nt )
Nt
2
) bH (Nt ) = bF (Nt ) = b (Nt ) =
s
2r Nt

(A.6)
so b is increasing in adjustment costs and discount rate, and depends on the production
and utility functions and Nt as well. This latter dependence is because the adjustment
costs matter as a fraction of the (desired) MPL. This proves expression 5 in the main
text.
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A.2 Optimal hiring policy (6) with convex adjustment costs
The Bellman equation with quadratic adjustment costs is given by
V (Nt 1) = max
ht

At (Nt 1 + ht)1     (Nt 1 + ht)   
2
h2t +
1
1 + r
EtV (Nt 1 + ht)

(A.7)
The rst-order condition for hiring ht
(1  )AtN t       ht +
1
1 + r
EtV
0 (Nt) = 0 (A.8)
and the envelope condition for employment Nt
V 0 (Nt 1) = (1  )AtN t    +
1
1 + r
EtV
0 (Nt) (A.9)
can be combined in the usual way to get an Euler equation for hiring
V 0 (Nt 1) =  ht
 ht = (1  )AtN t    +
 
1 + r
Etht+1 (A.10)
Using condition (4) for the frictionless optimal level of employment to eliminate
the level of technology At, we can write the Euler equation in terms of the ratio of
employment over its frictionless optimal level.
 ht = 

Nt
Nt

  1

+
 
1 + r
Etht+1 (A.11)
Since the adjustment process guarantees that Nt will not deviate too much from Nt ,
the Euler equation can be simplied by taking a linear approximation in Nt around Nt .
The result is expression (6) in the main text.
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B Proofs and derivations for non-separable production
B.1 Frictionless optimal level of employment (11)
Bellman equation
V (Lt 1) = max
et;Nt
n
At (etNt)
1  + (1  )Bt

(1  )Lt 1 + ~ ((1  et)Nt)
1 


  Nt
+
1
1 + r
V

(1  )Lt 1 + ~ ((1  et)Nt)
1 


(B.12)
The rst-order conditions for et and Nt are given by
0 = (1  )Ate t N1 t   
1  

(1  )BtL 1t ~ (1  et)
1 

 1
N
1 

t
  1  

~ (1  et)
1 

 1
N
1 

t
1
1 + r
V 0 (Lt) (B.13)
0 = (1  )Ate1 t N t + 
1  

(1  )BtL 1t ~ (1  et)
1 
 N
1 

 1
t   
+
1  

~ (1  et)
1 
 N
1 

 1
t
1
1 + r
V 0 (Lt) (B.14)
Envelope condition for Lt
V 0 (Lt 1) =  (1  ) (1  )BtL 1t +
1  
1 + r
V 0 (Lt) (B.15)
Combine the two FOC to eliminate V 0 (Lt)
(1  )At (etNt)  =  (B.16)
which tells us that etNt jumps immediately to its optimal steady state level ((1  )At=)1=.
Combining the FOC for et with the EC for Lt gives an Euler equation for for
(1  et)Nt.
((1  et)Nt)1 
1 
 = ~
(1  ) (1  )Bt

L 1t +
1  
1 + r
((1  et+1)Nt+1)1 
1 
 (B.17)
Combined with the LOM for OC, Lt = (1  )Lt 1+ ~ ((1  et)Nt)
1 
 , this is a system
of two di¤erence equations, one stable and one unstable, in (1  et)Nt and Lt.
In general, (1  et)Nt and Lt will slowly converge to steady state. However, it is
worth noticing that the dynamics of these variables do not depend on At (this is an
implication of additive separability of the production function), so if there is only a
(one-time permanent) shock only At and Lt was initially in steady state, then Lt and
(1  et)Nt remain in steady state. Since etNt is constant as well, that means that
et = e
, Nt = N and Lt = L are all constant in the frictionless optimum, assuming
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that Lt was in steady state to start with.
Thus, the frictionless optimum steady state is given by:
eN =

(1  )A

1=
(B.18)
which implies
L =
~


(1  ) (1  )B

 1 

=

r + 
(1 + r)
1=(1  ) (1  )B

 1 

(B.19)
e
1  e =

A
(1  )B
1=
(B.20)
N =

(1  )A

1=
+

(1  ) (1  )B

1=
(B.21)
which is expression (11) in the main text.
B.2 Proposition 3 for xed adjustment costs
There are now two endogenous state variables in the problem, the level of employment
Nt 1 and the organizational capital stock Lt 1, and V (Nt 1; Lt 1) denotes the value
of the planners programme. We analyze a one-time permanent shock to technology
At, as in appendix A.1, treating At = A as a parameter, and keep the productivity of
organizational capital production xed at Bt = 1. Since the model with non-convex
adjustment costs is highly non-linear and potentialy asymmetric, we consider only a
positive shock, i.e. an increase in technology At. We also assume that organizational
capital Lt is in steady state when the change in technology At occurs.
At each time t, the planner decides whether or not to adjust employment, whereas
even if she decides not to adjust employment, she can still choose the allocation of
workers et optimally, so that the value function satises the following Bellman equation,
V (Nt 1; Lt 1) = max

max
N
V (N;Lt 1)   ; (B.22)
max
et

A (etNt)
1  + (1  )Lt   Nt 1 +
1
1 + r
V (Nt 1; Lt)

(B.23)
where
Lt = (1  )Lt 1 + ~ ((1  et)Nt)
1 
 (B.24)
as in (9) and Nt = Nt 1 if employment is not adjusted.
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B.2.1 Outline of the proof
We show that for an intermediate sized shock, the optimal policy involves employment
adjustment after a delay. The proof runs by contradiction. Suppose that delayed ad-
justment is not optimal. Then, the optimal policy must be either to immediately hire
some more workers or to never do so. In sections B.2.2 and B.2.3, we solve for the
net present value of prots under each of these policies, which we denote by VIA and
VNA respectively. In section B.2.4, we then show that there exists a feasible adjustment
strategy involving delayed adjustment that gives a higher net present value of prots
VDA than never adjusting employment, VDA    > VNA at time t ! 1, and than
immediately adjusting employment, VNA > VIA    at time t = 0. Therefore, neither
of the two possible strategies without delay is optimal and it must be that the optimal
policy involves delay.
B.2.2 Immediate adjustment
If employment is adjusted immediately after the increase in productivity, it is set to
maximize the value of the program henceforward. Since the optimal amount of hiring
will depend on the initial value of the organizational capital stock, in general it is hard
to solve for VIA, but the problem simplies considerably with our assumption that the
economy was initially in steady state. In this case, the economy will be in steady state
after the one-time permanent increase in technology At as well, see the discussion below
equation (B.15) above, and there are no dynamics beyond the initial adjustments in et
and Nt.
Conditional on adjusting employment, the optimal level of employment is the same
as in the frictionless case, so that the value of the program with immediate adjustment,
after the adjustment costs are sunk, simply equals the value in the frictionless model,
which equal the net present value of an innite stream of constant prots, see (B.12),
VIA (Nt 1; L) = V (N; L) =
1 + r
r
h
A (eN)1  + (1  ) (L)   N
i
(B.25)
where L, e and N as in (B.19), (B.20) and (4), respectively.
B.2.3 No adjustment
If the planner decides not to adjust employment, Bellman equation (B.22) reduces to
V (Nt 1; Lt 1) = max
et

A (etNt 1)1  + (1  )Lt   Nt 1 +
1
1 + r
V (Nt 1; Lt)

(B.26)
In this case the rst order condition for et and the envelope condition for Lt may
be combined to get an Euler equation for the fraction of workers assigned to current
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productive tasks et.
A (etNt 1)  = (1  )L t +
1  
1 + r
A (et+1Nt 1)  (B.27)
The Euler equation and the law of motion for organizational capital (B.24) constitute
a system of two di¤erence equations that describes the joint dynamics of et and Lt. The
system is close to linear, and with a quadratic production function it would have been
exactly linear. We can linearize it by simply linearizing the marginal product function
around the frictionless steady state, i.e. et around eN=Nt 1 and Lt around L. The
linear system has one stable root, 1   , and one unstable root, (1 + r) = (1  ), so
that the solution is unique. When technology changes, et jumps to the saddle path and
then et and Lt gradually converge to their new steady state, which is di¤erent from the
frictionless optimal one.
The steady state of the system is given by
e
1  e =

A
1  
1=
=
e
1  e (B.28)
which is the same as in the frictionless optimum steady state, and organizational capital
L =
~

(1  e)Nt 1 = Nt 1
N
L (B.29)
where L does not depend on A, so is the same before and after the improvement in
technology.
Recall that before the change in technology employment was at its frictionless opti-
mal level, so that Nt 1 < N after the increase in At. Therefore, the new steady state
for organizational capital is lower than L and Lt slowly decreases. For et two things
happen. First, the increase in technology raises its steady state e. Second, initially
Lt > L, which by the Euler equation implies et > et+1, so that et overshoots its already
higher steady state and therefore declines over the transition.
The value of the program without employment adjustment is found by substituting
the optimal policy for et into Bellman equation (B.26). The e¤ects of et and Lt on the
value of the program work in the same direction.
VNA (Nt; Lt) =
1X
s=0

1
1 + r
s At
1   (et+sNt)
1  +
Bt
1  L
1 
t+s   Nt

(B.30)
After the increase in A, both Lt and et decrease, so that VNA decreases as well.
Comparing (B.25) and (B.30), it is clear that initially the value of the rm is higher if
employment is immediately adjusted, VIA (Nt 1; L) > VNA (Nt 1; L), simply because
VIA (Nt 1; L) = V (N; L) = maxN VNA (N;L). Of course, that observation does not
imply that it is always preferrably to adjust employment, because of the adjustment
costs. More importantly for the proof, the value of the program without adjusting
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employment is not constant over time. Since the value function is strictly increasing
in Lt, VNA (Nt; Lt) decreases over time as the organizational capital stock is slowly
depleted and, after an initial major rellocation towards production, workers are gradually
allocated back from production to organizational tasks.
B.2.4 Delayed adjustment
Now consider the decision whether or not to hire extra workers, and suppose that the
rm is only allowed to adjust employment immediately or not at all. Comparing (B.25)
and (B.30), we see that the di¤erence between the net present value of prots in either
case VIA (Nt 1; L)   VNA (Nt 1; L) is increasing in the size of the shock N   Nt 1.
Therefore, if the shock is su¢ ciently small, then VIA   VNA <  and the rm prefers
not to adjust employment at t = 0, whereas if the shock is su¢ ciently large, then
VIA   VNA >  and the rm prefers to immediately hire more workers.
An interesting situation arises if N Nt 1 is small enough so that VIA  VNA <  ,
i.e. the rms prefers no hiring over immediately hiring, but not by much. Since VNA
decreases over time, in this case the inequality is reverted at some point, i.e. VIA VNA >
 for some t > T , at which point the rm would regret not having adjusted employment
immediately. Of course, immediately adjusting and never adjusting employment are
not the only two choices available to the rm, and the fact that rms may regret their
decision to not adjust employment immediately if these were the only two options does
not immediately imply that delayed adjustment is the optimal policy. However, we will
show that there exists a feasible policy involving delayed adjustment that dominates
both the option to immediately adjust and the option to never adjust employment.
This will complete the proof of proposition 3.
Consider the following adjustment policy. When productivity increases, initially no
new workers are hired but the fraction of workers assigned to current productive tasks
is set to the level e that is optimal in the new steady state. Then, after a long time
T , new workers are hired, setting employment to the same levels that would have been
optimal if these workers would have been hired immediately, maintaining the fraction
of workers assigned to current production at e. While not necessarily optimal, because
the organizational capital stock will no longer be at L when employment is adjusted,
this policy is clearly feasible. We will show that this adjustment policy results in higher
prots both than adjusting immediately and than never adjusting employment.
If we let the time of adjustment T ! 1, then the value of the program under
the proposed policy with delayed adjustment approaches the value of the program if
employment is never adjusted at time zero VDA ! VNA. On the other hand, at time
T , when employment adjustment has just happened, the value of the program under
delayed adjustment equals the value of the program under immediate adjustment, except
that the organizational capital stock is at its steady state level under no adjustment,
VDA (N
; LT ) = VIA

N; Nt 1N L


. Delayed adjustment dominates both immediate
adjustment and no adjustment if it preferred over immediate adjustment at time zero and
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over not adjusting at time T and onwards. Thus, we need the following two conditions
to hold simultaneously:
VNA (Nt 1; L) > VIA (N; L)   (B.31)
VIA

N;
Nt 1
N
L

   > VNA

Nt 1;
Nt 1
N
L

(B.32)
For eachNt 1=N, we can nd a  for which both inequalities are satised, which implies
that for each  , we can also nd a shock Nt 1=N which satises both conditions.
B.3 Proposition 4 for convex adjustment costs
B.3.1 Derivation of the quilibrium conditions
Bellman equation
V (Nt 1; Lt 1) = max
et;ht

At (etNt)
1  + (1  )BtLt   Nt  
1
2
 h2t +
1
1 + r
V (Nt; Lt)

(B.33)
where
Nt = Nt 1 + ht (B.34)
Lt = (1  )Lt 1 + ~ ((1  et)Nt)
1 
 (B.35)
FOC(ht)
0 = (1  )At (etNt)  et +  (1  )BtL 1t
1  

~ ((1  et)Nt)
1 

 1
(1  et)      ht
+
1
1 + r

V1;t+1 +
1  

~ ((1  et)Nt)
1 

 1
(1  et)V2;t+1

(B.36)
EC(Nt 1)
VN;t = (1  )At (etNt)  et +  (1  )BtL 1t
1  

~ ((1  et)Nt)
1 

 1
(1  et)  
+
1
1 + r

VN;t+1 +
1  

~ ((1  et)Nt)
1 

 1
(1  et)VL;t+1

(B.37)
which imply
VN;t =  ht (B.38)
and an Euler equation for hiring
 ht = (1  )At (etNt)  et +  (1  )BtL 1t
1  

~ ((1  et)Nt)
1 

 1
(1  et)  
+
1
1 + r

 ht+1 +
1  

~ ((1  et)Nt)
1 

 1
(1  et)VL;t+1

(B.39)
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FOC(et)
0 = (1  )At (etNt) Nt    (1  )BtL 1t
1  

~ ((1  et)Nt)
1 

 1
Nt
  1
1 + r
1  

~ ((1  et)Nt)
1 

 1
NtVL;t+1 (B.40)
EC(Lt)
VL;t =  (1  )BtL 1t (1  ) +
1  
1 + r
VL;t+1 (B.41)
Use the FOC for et to further simplify the Euler equation for ht
 ht = (1  )At (etNt)     + 1
1 + r
 ht+1 (B.42)
which is exactly the same as for the model with separable production function, except
for the  and the et, so that any change in the dynamics for ht will need to come through
dynamics in et. Using the expression for the frictionless optimum steady state eN,
see equation (11), to elimate the technology shock, (1  )At =  (eN), the Euler
equation for hiring can be rewritten as (12) in the main text.
Combine the FOC for et and the EC for Lt in the usual way to get a second Euler
equation.
VL;t = 
1  
~
At
(etNt)
 
((1  et)Nt)
1 

 1 (B.43)
(etNt)
 
((1  et)Nt)
1 

 1 =
~
(1  )Bt
At
L 1t +
1  
1 + r
At+1
At
(et+1Nt+1)
 
((1  et+1)Nt+1)
1 

 1 (B.44)
which again forms a saddle-path stable system of di¤erence equations in combination
with the LOM for OC
Lt = (1  )Lt 1 + ~ ((1  et)Nt)
1 
 (B.45)
B.3.2 The dynamics of hiring
Summarizing, the dynamics of hiring ht, joint with those for et, Nt and Lt are given by
the following dynamic system.
 ht = (1  )At (etNt)     + 1
1 + r
 ht+1 (B.46)
(etNt)
 
((1  et)Nt)
1 

 1 =
~
(1  )Bt
At
L 1t +
1  
1 + r
At+1
At
(et+1Nt+1)
 
((1  et+1)Nt+1)
1 

 1 (B.47)
Nt = Nt 1 + ht (B.48)
Lt = (1  )Lt 1 + ~ ((1  et)Nt)
1 
 (B.49)
These are four di¤erence equations in four unknowns, which we solve numerically
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using Dynare.
For some parameter values, the model predicts a delay in hiring, in the sense that
the response of hiring to an increase in technology peaks not on impact of the shock but
one or more periods later. To explore how these dynamics depend on parameter values,
we dene the following summary statistics:
1. We say that the response of hiring exhibits delay if hiring initially increases after
a shock, i.e. if jh+1j > jh j where  is the period that the change in technology
At occurs.
2. If there is delay, then we dene the amount of delay as the relative increase in hiring
after impact. Let h be hiring in the period the change in technology occurs, and
let hp denote hiring in the peak period. Then, the amount of delay is dened as
(jhpj   jh j) = jhpj.
3. The length of the delay is dened simply as the time between the period in which
hiring peaks and the period when the shock hit, p   .
Figures B.1 and B.2 show for which combinations of adjustment costs  , share
1    and depreciation rate  of organizational capital delayed hiring occurs. Figures
B.3, B.4, B.5, B.6 and B.7 show the amount and length of the delay as a function of
adjustment costs  , the discount rate r, the organizational capital share 1   , the
depreciation rate of organizational capital , and diminishing returns in organizational
capital , respectively. Delayed adjustment is more likely to occur, larger and longer for
higher adjustment costs, a higher discount rate, a higher organizational capital share
and a lower depreciation rate of organizational capital. Delay becomes less likely as
diminishing returns in the use of organizational capital in production disappear, i.e. for
! 1 and the length of the delay seems to be maximized for  around 1  = 0:67, i.e.
if diminishing returns are entirely in the use rather than the production of organizational
capital.
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Figure B.1: Delayed adjustment (+) for di¤erent values of adjustment costs  and the
share of organizational capital in production 1  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Figure B.3: Amount and length of delay in hiring for di¤erent values of adjustment costs
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Figure B.5: Amount and length of delay in hiring for di¤erent values of the share of
organizational capital in production 1  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C Capital adjustment
The Bellman equation is given by
V (Kt 1; Lt 1) = max
ut;it

At (utKt)
 + (1  )BtLt   it  
 
2
i2t +
1
1 + r
EtV (Kt; Lt)

(C.50)
where
Kt = Kt 1 + it (C.51)
Lt = (1  )Lt 1 + ~ ((1  ut)Kt)

 (C.52)
Following the same steps as in appendix B.3 (combining the rst-order condition
for it with the envelope condition for Kt to get an Euler equation, and then using
the rst-order condition for ut to simplify it), we get the following Euler equation for
investment
 it = At (utKt)
 1   r
1 + r
+
1
1 + r
 ht+1 (C.53)
Setting  = 0 for the frictionless allocation gives,
At (u

tK

t )
 1 =
r
1 + r
(C.54)
so that we can rewite the Euler equation as,
 it =

ut
ut
Kt
Kt
 1 r
1 + r
  r
1 + r
+
1
1 + r
 ht+1 (C.55)
which simplies to equation (16) in the main text.
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D Equilibrium conditions quantitative model
Bellman equation
V (Nt 1;Kt 1; Lt 1) = max
et;ut;ht;it
(
Zt



At (utKt)
 (etNt)
1 
 1

+ (1  ) (BtLt )
 1

 
 1
 Nt   Ztit   KZtKt 1    N
2
Zth
2
t  
 K
2
Zti
2
t +
1
1 + r
EtV (Nt;Kt; Lt)

(D.56)
where
Nt = Nt 1 + ht (D.57)
Kt = Kt 1 + it (D.58)
Lt = (1  )Lt 1 + ~ ((1  ut)Kt)

 ((1  et)Nt)
1 
 (D.59)
D.1 Labor
Combining FOC(ht) and EC(Nt 1) to get an Euler equation for ht
VN (Nt 1;Kt 1; Lt 1) =  NZtht (D.60)
Zt Nht =  [:::]

 1 1 Zt

(1  )

At (utKt)
 (etNt)
1 
 1
 1
Nt
+ (1  ) (1  ) (BtLt )
 1

1
Lt
~ ((1  ut)Kt)

 ((1  et)Nt)
1 

1
Nt

  
+
1  

~ ((1  ut)Kt)

 ((1  et)Nt)
1 

1
Nt
1
1 + r
EtVL (Nt;Kt; Lt) +
 N
1 + r
EtZt+1ht+1
(D.61)
Simplify using FOC(et)
 Nht =  [:::]

 1 1 (1  )

At (utKt)
 (etNt)
1 
 1
 1
etNt
  
Zt
+ NEt

1
1 + r
Zt+1
Zt
ht+1

(D.62)
D.2 Capital
Combine FOC(it) and EC(Kt 1) to get an Euler equation for it
VK (Nt 1;Kt 1; Lt 1) = Zt (1  K +  Kit) (D.63)
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Zt (1  K +  Kit) =  [:::]

 1 1 Zt



At (utKt)
 (etNt)
1 
 1
 1
Kt
+ (1  ) (BtLt )
 1

1
Lt
~ ((1  ut)Kt)

 ((1  et)Nt)
1 

1
Kt

  ZtK
+


~ ((1  ut)Kt)

 ((1  et)Nt)
1 

1
Kt
1
1 + r
EtVL (Nt;Kt; Lt)
+
1
1 + r
Et [1  K +  Kit+1] (D.64)
Simplify using the FOC(ut)
 Kit =  [:::]

 1 1 

At (utKt)
 (etNt)
1 
 1
 1
utKt
 

r + K
1 + r
  1  K
1 + r
Zt+1   Zt
Zt

+  KEt

1
1 + r
Zt+1
Zt
it+1

(D.65)
D.3 Organizational capital
Combine FOC(et) and FOC(ut) to get a restriction on the allocations of labor and
capital
0 =  [:::]

 1 1 Zt



At (utKt)
 (etNt)
1 
 1


1  et
et
  1  ut
ut

(D.66)
which implies
et = ut (D.67)
EC(Lt 1)
VL (Nt 1;Kt 1; Lt 1) =  [:::]

 1 1 Zt (1  ) (BtLt )
 1

1  
Lt
+
1  
1 + r
EtVL (Nt;Kt; Lt)
(D.68)
Combine FOC(et) and EC(Lt 1) to get a third Euler equation
VL (Nt 1;Kt 1; Lt 1) = 
1  
~
 [:::]

 1 1 Zt

At (utKt)
 (etNt)
1 
 1

((1  ut)Kt)

 ((1  et)Nt)
1 

1  et
et
(D.69)

t
1  et
et
=
1  

~
(BtL

t )
 1

Lt
+ (1  )Et

1
1 + r
Zt+1
Zt
t+1
t

t+1
1  et+1
et+1

(D.70)
where
t =  [:::]

 1 1 , 
t =

At (utKt)
 (etNt)
1 
 1

((1  ut)Kt)

 ((1  et)Nt)
1 

(D.71)
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D.4 Summary of equilibrium conditions
Denitions
t = 



At (utKt)
 (etNt)
1 
 1

+ (1  ) (BtLt )
 1

 
 1 1
(D.72)

t =

At (utKt)
 (etNt)
1 
 1

((1  ut)Kt)

 ((1  et)Nt)
1 

(D.73)
Euler equation for hiring
 Nht = t (1  )

At (utKt)
 (etNt)
1 
 1
 1
etNt
  
Zt
+  NEt

1
1 + r
Zt+1
Zt
ht+1

(D.74)
Euler equation for investment
 Kit = t

At (utKt)
 (etNt)
1 
 1
 1
utKt
 

r + K
1 + r
  1  K
1 + r
Zt+1   Zt
Zt

+  KEt

1
1 + r
Zt+1
Zt
it+1

(D.75)
Labor and capital allocation
et = ut (D.76)
Euler equation for organizational investment

t
1  et
et
=
1  

~
(BtL

t )
 1

Lt
+ (1  )Et

1
1 + r
Zt+1
Zt
t+1
t

t+1
1  et+1
et+1

(D.77)
Laws of motion
Nt = Nt 1 + ht (D.78)
Kt = Kt 1 + it (D.79)
Lt = (1  )Lt 1 + ~ ((1  ut)Kt)

 ((1  et)Nt)
1 
 (D.80)
This is a system of 7 di¤erence equations in 7 variables: et, ut, ht, it, Nt, Kt and Lt.
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E Cross-industry evidence
The industry-level evidence for a positive correlation between delayed adjustment and
organizational capital intensity, discussed in section 6.3 in the main text, is summarized
in table E.1.
The measures of delay in hiring and investment were calculated from the US KLEMS
dataset provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (2019a),8 which contains information
on labor and capital input (employment and capital services) and labor and capital
productivity (output employee and per unit of capital services) as indices (2007=100) by
6-digit NAICS industries and year, for the period 1987-2018. We calculated (net) hiring
and investment as the (annual) rst di¤erence in labor and capital input, respectively.
In order to obtain a scalar measure of delay, we rst regress the rst di¤erences of
hiring and investment on an MA(6) in the rst di¤erences of labor and capital pro-
ductivity, respectively, where 6 annual lags correspond to the 24 quarterly lags we use
for aggregate data. We impose the constraint that the sum of the coe¢ cients in this
MA regression equals zero, so that hiring and investment return to zero after 6 years,
and construct the response of hiring and investment in levels. Then, we calculate the
amount of delay as the di¤erence between peak hiring/investment and hiring/investment
on impact, as a fraction of peak hiring/investment.
We aggregated the 6-digit NAICS data to the appropriate level to match with data
from other sources on organizational capital intensity. Information Capital intensity is
reported in the same dataset at the 3-digit NAICS level, but only for manufacturing
industries (NAICS codes 331-339, 18 industries). Data on intangible capital, organiza-
tional and training intensity (Carol Corrado (2016, table 5, p.100)) are from INTAN-
Invest,9 and are organized at major NACE (Nomenclature des Activités Économiques
dans la Communauté Européenne) sectors. We use the NAICS 2017 to ISIC Rev.4
crosswalk provided by the Census Bureau,10 in combination with ISIC REV.4 - NACE
REV.2 crosswalk,11 to match and aggregate to major NACE sectors. E-capital is calcu-
lated and reported by Hall (2000a, table 5, p.100) at the 2-digit SIC level (22 industries
spanning almost the entire economy), whereas employer-provided training is reported
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (2019b, table 5, p.100) from the 1995 Survey of Em-
ployer Provided Training (SEPT) at the level of 9 major industries,12 with a mapping
provided to 2-digit SIC codes. We used the NAICS to SIC crosswalk from the NAICS
Association,13 to assign 4-digit SIC codes to the industries in our data, which we then
aggregate to 2-digit SIC and BLS major industries. We average labor and capital input
and productivity measures weighting by labor compensation cost in million US dollars
as a measure of size of the di¤erent industries.
8https://www.bls.gov/mfp/
9http://www.intaninvest.net/
10https://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/concordances/concordances.html
11https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ramon/relations/index.cfm?TargetUrl=LST_REL&IntCurrentPage=10
12https://www.bls.gov/news.release/sept.nws.htm
13https://www.naics.com/naics-to-sic-crosswalk-search-results/
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Correlation with delay in
Measure of OC intensity Sample hiring investment
IC capital intensity (%) 3-digit NAICS (N = 18) 0:23 0:09
(BLS) (manufacturing only) [0:67] [0:15]
Intangible capital intensity NACE major industries (N = 12) 0:32
(INTAN Invest) [0:63]
Organizational capital int NACE major industries (N = 12)  0:07
(INTAN Invest) [0:08]
Training intensity NACE major industries (N = 12)  0:08
(INTAN Invest) [0:09]
e-Capital (log) 2-digit SIC (N = 15)  0:02
[0:01]
CHS measure OC investment Approx 3-digit NAICS (N = 28) 0:28
(Squicciarinii & Le Mouel 2012) [0:27]
Task-based measure OC inv Approx 3-digit NAICS (N = 28) 0:22
(Squicciarinii & Le Mouel 2012) [0:34]
Employer-provided training BLS major ind (N = 8) 0:69
(% workers formal training) [0:44]
Employer-provided training BLS major ind (N = 8) 0:38
(hours of formal training) [0:98]
Table E.1: Persistence across industries. The amount of delay is measured as peak
minus impact hiring or investment as a fraction of peak hiring/investment. Standard
errors for the correlation coe¢ cients were calculated using the delta method.
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